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Abstract
We are living through a global urban transition, but the timing of this transition has varied signifi-
cantly across countries and regions. This geographic variation in timing matters, both theoretically
and substantively. Yet contemporary debates on urbanism hinge primarily on questions of univers-
alism versus particularism, at the expense of attention to how history and geography collide to
shape urban processes. Specifically, they neglect the critical fact that urbanisation in many coun-
tries today is late within the context of the global urban transition. We argue that trajectories of
contemporary urbanisation must be understood in relation to a suite of conditions unique to the
late 20th and early 21st centuries and partly shaped by early urbanisation, including historically
unprecedented demographic intensity, hyperglobalisation, centripetal state politics and the spectre of
environmental catastrophe in the late Anthropocene. These factors condition the range of possibili-
ties for late urbanisers in ways that did not apply to early urbanisers yet can also produce diverse
outcomes depending on local circumstances. We draw on a comparison between countries in
sub-Saharan Africa and China to illustrate why the conditions of late urbanisation matter, but also
why they have produced highly variable outcomes and are not deterministic of urban futures.
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Introduction
Urban theory has had a fertile and fractious
decade. The question of the fundamental defi-
nition of the urban returned with force after
Brenner and Schmid (2014, 2015) issued a
challenge to dominant epistemological fram-
ings of urbanisation, drawing on Lefebvre
(1970) to popularise the idea of ‘planetary
urbanisation’. Storper and Scott (2016)
responded by reasserting an agglomeration-
based definition – a perspective that has been
(and continues to be) highly influential in both
academic and policy domains. In parallel,
there was a flourishing of approaches empha-
sising the particularities of ‘Southern’ cities in
the face of theories developed in the North
(Robinson, 2006; Roy, 2009; Schindler, 2017;
Watson, 2009), and a backlash against the
more totalising claims of ‘planetary urbanisa-
tion’ building on feminist, postcolonial and
post-structuralist perspectives (Angelo and
Goh, 2020; Derickson, 2018; Reddy, 2018).
These currents within urban theory can
be broadly characterised for heuristic pur-
poses as two approaches espousing very
different sorts of universalism, and one pri-
marily emphasising difference and geogra-
phical particularism. On the one hand, Scott
and Storper (2016) assert that the urban can
be universally defined and delimited with
reference to a set of general criteria, rooted
in the ‘urban land nexus’. Brenner and
Schmid (2014) reject this perspective but
claim that the urban has become planetary
in its reach and manifestation, positing that
there ‘is no longer any outside to the urban
world’ (p. 750; emphasis in original). It is
reasonable, therefore, to characterise this as
a dispute between a universal definition of
urban form and a thesis predicated on univer-
sal reach of the urban process (but with a dif-
fuse definition of urban form). While
‘planetary urbanisation’ is not necessarily
incompatible with a focus on diversity
(Angelo and Goh, 2020; Schmid et al.,
2018), it is feminist and postcolonial scholars
that have foregrounded difference to pro-
mote anti-universalising accounts of the
urban process (Derickson, 2015; Roy, 2016).
While these debates have been very pro-
ductive, it is notable that they have been
20 21
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occurring within quite a narrow disciplinary
range, primarily involving geographers and
planning theorists. Sociologists, political
scientists, historians, demographers and
economists all played central roles in elabor-
ating urban theory in the 20th century yet
are only partly drawn into contemporary
theorisation of the urban. Among other
things, this calls attention to the fact that by
focusing primarily on geographical univers-
ality versus specificity, these approaches do
not adequately consider the question of vari-
able temporality as central to the global geo-
graphy of urban transformation. This means
foregrounding the fact that cities in different
places have been made at different times.
Comparative urban scholarship has focused
heavily on spatial context, but largely over-
looked the comparative historical context.
Yet it is clear that when a society transitions
from predominantly rural living to predomi-
nantly urban living has a profound impact
on how this transition unfolds.
Brenner and Schmid (2014, 2015) reject
this kind of periodisation on the grounds
that the epistemological and methodological
bases for measuring urbanisation are flawed.
There are certainly formidable challenges in
this regard that necessitate ongoing efforts
to rethink how urbanisation is measured
(Buettner, 2015; Bureau of the Census, 2021;
Schroeder and Pacas, 2021) as well prompt-
ing reflections on what this means for theo-
rising the urban. Yet while it may be difficult
or even futile to delineate a rigid urban/rural
divide, it is possible to say that some societies
and regions of the world urbanised – by any
definition – before others. This fact has very
real material, visceral and ecological conse-
quences ranging from changes in life expec-
tancy, fertility rates and gender norms to
terrestrial, aquatic and atmospheric environ-
mental change. Moreover, despite the exten-
sive geographical reach of the processes
associated with urbanisation, highlighted by
eminent scholars such as Louis Wirth in
1938 and Jane Jacobs in 1969, the urban–
rural ‘lens’ continues to be hugely significant
both discursively (Angelo, 2017) and in
terms of the concrete efforts by countries in
the North to foster new forms of territorial
integration through development assistance
to the South (e.g. Schindler and Kanai,
2021).
We therefore reassert in this paper the
importance of the urban transition – not to
perpetuate the ‘urban age’ discourse but to
foreground the varied timing of urbanisation
in different parts of the world. This geo-
historical approach does not mean merely
scrutinising the histories of particular urban
places but rather emphasising that processes
of urbanisation and urban growth are taking
place today not only in ‘a world of cities’
(Robinson, 2011) but in a world where some
societies urbanised before others. In other
words, it is not only the ‘Southern-ness’ or
post-coloniality of cities of the South that
makes them different. It is also the fact that
urbanising late within the global urban tran-
sition involves distinct challenges and
opportunities.
Countries that experienced this transition
100 or more years ago did so under very dif-
ferent technological, demographic, eco-
nomic, political and ecological conditions
than those experiencing it now. Moreover,
early urbanisers have directly influenced
many of the conditions of late urbanisation,
not just through colonial legacies but
through the political, economic and environ-
mental conditions generated by their own
earlier urbanisation and their contemporary
power in global institutions. We therefore
need to build on, but also think beyond,
Schmid et al.’s (2018) coupling of diachronic
analysis of historical pathways in a given
city with synchronic analysis of spatial urban
forms. Explaining the conditions of urbani-
sation in much of the contemporary world
requires interrogating the intersection of his-
tory and geography not only at particular
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urban sites, but at the level of the global
urban transition.
This requires closer attention to differen-
tiations within the South, which encom-
passes highly variable degrees of
urbanisation among countries. The idea of a
‘Southern’ experience of urbanism
(Schindler, 2017; Watson, 2009) usefully
highlights characteristics that are more sig-
nificant on average in cities outside the
industrialised North. However, while we
appreciate the ongoing everyday utility of
the category of ‘global South’ and the value
of ‘Southern perspectives’ as a form of cri-
tique, the limitations of the ‘South’ as a geo-
graphical category for analysis are
increasingly recognised (Lawhon and
Truelove, 2020; Mabin, 2014).
In this article, we take a geohistorical
approach to understanding the conditions of
urbanisation in countries that we identify as
urbanising relatively late. While both our
definition and periodisation of urbanisation
are inevitably open to dispute, the temporal
dimension of the underlying processes that
we aim to capture is real and significant. We
argue that countries undergoing urbanisa-
tion and urban growth today are experien-
cing these processes under historically
unique conditions of demographic intensity,
hyperglobalisation, centripetal state politics
and the spectre of environmental catastrophe.
These geohistorical conditions are not
deterministic in any given context; indeed,
our perspective is both non-deterministic
and anti-universalising. We seek to specify
how certain geohistorical conditions collide
with local circumstances to shape novel
urban development pathways in cities
around the world. Unlike any of the per-
spectives discussed above, we foreground
both the difference between and relationship
between earlier and later urban transitions,
while also exploring the highly varied path-
ways evident among later urbanisers. To
emphasise this point, we compare the very
different experiences of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa with that of China. In doing
so, we highlight the salience of two key ques-
tions: (1) how do the conditions of late urba-
nisation affect the range of possible urban
development trajectories? And (2) what
unique collisions of geohistorical conditions
and local circumstances account for major
divergences among these trajectories? Unlike
the concept of ‘Southern urbanism’, which
seeks to provide an umbrella category for
diverse places, the concept of late urbanisa-
tion is a historical classification that makes
no a priori assumptions about similarities
between places.
While the conditions of late urbanisation
yield diverse outcomes across local and
regional contexts, we argue that they pro-
duce phenomena – such as hyper-
development in Chinese cities, urbanisation
without industrial development in African
countries, and perverse incentives driving
distinct forms of real estate investment in
both contexts – that were not characteristic
of early urbanisers. Moreover, confronting
the conditions of late urbanisation may sti-
mulate innovations that place late urbanisers
on the frontier of new urban trajectories. We
conclude with reflections on the implications
of this perspective for contemporary urban
theory, and a call for scholars to look
beyond all-encompassing accounts of the
urban condition in order to consider how the
geohistorical conditions of late urbanisation
interact with specific cities and urban sys-
tems to generate unique urban trajectories.
What is ‘late urbanisation’?
We use the term ‘urbanisation’ in a strictly
spatial-demographic sense to refer to an
increase in the proportion of people living in
urban settlements within a country or region.
While there is no universal definition of an
urban settlement (Brenner and Schmid,
2014; Fox and Goodfellow, 2016), we are
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essentially interested in the growth of rela-
tively large, densely populated and perma-
nent human settlements. To be clear, we are
not using the terms ‘urban’ and ‘urbanisa-
tion’ to denote structural economic change
(e.g. Potts, 2017), the physical development
of built environments or the spread of partic-
ular aspects of global capitalism associated
with the more ‘extended’ ramifications of
urbanisation (e.g. Brenner and Schmid,
2014, 2015). We also recognise the methodo-
logical flaws with the measures we use below,
but in the absence of more robust measures
they are the best available for historical
cross-country comparison and do reflect –
albeit imperfectly – the general trends we
seek to explore. Our use of the 50%measure,
though problematic for reasons that Brenner
and Schmid (2014) document, is taken as a
crude proxy not for the entry of the world
into an ‘urban age’ but for the shift towards
a phase of mass urbanisation in specific
countries.
From a global perspective, there are three
major phases in the history of urbanisation.
The first and longest phase began with the
rise of the first cities roughly 6000 years ago
and ends in roughly 1800. During this phase,
cities emerged independently in Africa, Asia,
Europe, North America and South America.
But the overall urban population remained
relatively small – hovering around 5% of the
total global population (Fox, 2012). The sec-
ond phase, which we date between 1800 and
the Second World War, is marked by sus-
tained growth of urban populations (in both
absolute and relative terms) in parts of
Europe, the Americas, Japan, Australia and
New Zealand. This is the first time societies
experienced permanent transitions towards
predominantly urban living. As Table 1
shows, by 1950 about 30 countries had more
than 50% of their populations living in
urban areas. These countries are ‘early urba-
nisers’ in our framework. The third phase
began during the Second World War and
continues to this day. This latter phase has
been characterised by sustained increases in
urban populations in virtually all countries.
However, as Table 1 illustrates, this latter
phase has been staggered across countries
and regions. Although we do not propose a
strict cut-off for classifying countries as
‘early’ or ‘late’ urbanisers, it is clear that
many countries (and most in Africa) are
urbanising late within the context of this glo-
bal urban transition. This temporal sequen-
cing has important implications for how
cities grow and develop.
In advancing this schema, two important
clarifications are needed. First, urbanising
late does not imply the absence of deep
urban history. For example, parts of Africa
have urban histories dating back several mil-
lennia, including areas of present-day
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali and Zimbabwe as
well as North Africa and the Swahili Coast.
Meanwhile, China has many cities that have
been continuously inhabited for thousands
of years. In all these cases, however, the cur-
rent territory remained predominantly rural
until very recently, notwithstanding the
important differences in the number and
sizes of historically significant cities. As dis-
cussed below, the relative depth of these
urban histories can itself intersect with the
conditions of late urbanisation with dra-
matic results.
Second, the conditions of late urbanisa-
tion can have both negative and positive
implications. On the one hand, many early
urbanisers reaped gains that cannot be repli-
cated under current conditions; but on the
other, late urbanising regions can benefit
from urban experiences and innovations
incubated elsewhere. Unlike the idea of ‘late
development’, the term ‘late urbanisation’
does not imply anything teleological, has no
normative content and should not be read as
pejorative. The term simply serves to charac-
terise the experience of urbanisation within a
geohistorical context: ‘late’ in this sense
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Table 1. Countries listed according to when the urban population share reached 50%.
Pre-1950 1950–1970 1970–1990 1990–2010 2010–2030 Post-2030
Argentina Armenia Algeria Albania Benin Afghanistan Mozambique
Australia Azerbaijan Belarus Angola Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Bangladesh Myanmar
Austria Brazil Bolivia Botswana China Burkina Faso Nepal
Belgium Bulgaria Congo Cameroon Côte d’Ivoire Burundi Niger
Canada Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador DR Congo Cambodia Pakistan
Chile DPR Korea Croatia Ghana Guatemala Central African Rep. Papua New Guinea
Cuba Estonia Cyprus Honduras Haiti Chad Rep. of Moldova
Czechia Finland Dominican Rep. Indonesia Mali Egypt Rwanda
Denmark Iraq Ecuador Jamaica Mauritania Eritrea Sierra Leone
France Ireland Gabon Montenegro Namibia Ethiopia South Sudan
Germany Jordan Georgia Morocco Nigeria Guinea Sri Lanka
Greece Kazakhstan Iran Paraguay Philippines Guinea-Bissau Sudan
Hong Kong SAR Latvia Liberia Portugal Senegal Guyana Tajikistan
Hungary Lebanon Malaysia Syrian Arab Rep. Somalia India Tanzania
Israel Libya Mongolia Uzbekistan Thailand Kenya Timor-Leste
Italy Lithuania Nicaragua Turkmenistan Kyrgyzstan Togo
Japan Mexico Oman Zambia Lao PDR Uganda
Malta Peru Panama Lesotho Viet Nam
Netherlands Poland Rep. of Korea Madagascar Yemen
New Zealand Puerto Rico Romania Malawi Zimbabwe
Norway Russian Federation Saudi Arabia Mauritius






















merely denotes taking place ‘after’ some
other regions of the world urbanised, rather
than implying that the process is somehow
‘tardy’ or ‘belated’. Indeed, we seek to
emphasise that late urbanisation is not some
kind of aberration, nor is it secondary to
early urbanisation in its global significance.
In fact, late urbanisation is the norm. In
1960, the combined population of the ‘early
urbanisers’ shown in the first column of
Table 1 accounted for just 21% of the total
global population and 43% of the global
urban population (according to UN
estimates).
Demographic intensity
Demographic intensity is one of the defining
conditions of late urbanisation. Early urba-
nisers experienced relatively moderate demo-
graphic changes, which were associated with
structural transformation of domestic
economies. By contrast, late urbanisers have
exhibited historically unprecedented rates of
urban population growth. In many cases
(e.g. many African countries) this has hap-
pened without concomitant economic
growth, while in others demographic inten-
sity has been augmented by exceptionally
rapid economic change made possible by
contemporary economic conditions (e.g.
South Korea and China).
Early urbanisers saw life expectancy
increase slowly but steadily as they indus-
trialised through the 19th and 20th centu-
ries. Social scientists have tended to assume
(wrongly) that both urbanisation and
improvements in life expectancy were driven
by industrialisation (see Szreter, 1997). In
practice, substantial but incremental
improvements in public health and medicine
helped to alleviate some of the worst human
consequences of early industrialisation.
Nevertheless, industrialisation drove
demand for urban labour, which stimulated
rural–urban migration and hence urbanisa-
tion. But the incremental nature of these
changes led to a prolonged urban transition.
By contrast, most African countries have
experienced explosive urban population
growth without significant structural eco-
nomic change thanks to declining mortality
rates rather than industrialisation
(Bandyopadhyay and Green, 2018; Dyson,
2011; Fox, 2012, 2017; Gollin et al., 2016;
Menashe-Oren and Boquier, 2021). After
the Second World War, there was a rapid
diffusion of vaccines, antibiotics, famine
relief, clinical infrastructure, sanitation
infrastructure and medical knowledge
around the world, which led to a dramatic
fall in mortality in many of the world’s
poorest countries, regardless of economic
conditions and trends. While it took roughly
100 years for life expectancy in Europe to
increase from 36 (in 1820) to 50 (in 1920),
Africa experienced the same improvement in
just 50 years between 1950 and 2000 (Riley,
2005; United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population
Division, 2018). This precipitous decline in
mortality is the primary engine of urban
growth in many late urbanisers. Rural–
urban migration has certainly played a sig-
nificant role in driving urban growth in
African countries, but natural growth within
cities has been an equal contributor in East
and southern Africa and a majority contri-
butor in Central and West Africa since at
least 1985 (Menashe-Oren and Boquier,
2021). The millions of people living in infor-
mal settlements are increasingly native urba-
nites, born and raised in towns and cities.
The widely noted phenomenon of urbanisa-
tion without industrialisation in Africa is
not an aberration but rather a natural by-
product of significant improvements in life
expectancy. China’s urban transition in the
late 20th century was also influenced by
demographic fundamentals, but further
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accelerated by economic conditions in the
second half of the 20th century, which sti-
mulated the greatest sustained wave of
rural–urban migration in history. However,
natural increase in urban areas is now the
dominant driver of urban population growth
in China (Menashe-Oren and Boquier,
2021).
The intensity of spatial demographic
change is clear when we compare the urban
transitions of Europe, sub-Saharan Africa
and China. While it took 150 years for
Europe to shift from 12% urban to 50%
urban, it took China just 60 years to make
the same transition. It will likely take Africa
90 years to shift from 11% urban to 50%
urban based on current projections. China
and sub-Saharan Africa have been urbanis-
ing much faster than Europe did.
Second, and more importantly, the scale
of population change in these three regions
is not even remotely comparable. Europe
experienced a peak urban population growth
rate of just over 2% per annum; the urban
growth rate in both China and sub-Saharan
Africa peaked at over 5% per annum (many
countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced
episodes of much faster urban growth).
Moreover, rates of urban growth in both
regions today continue to exceed the peak
rates observed in Europe during the heat of
the industrial revolution. In short, early
urbanisers in Europe experienced far less
raw demographic pressure than late urbani-
sers have. A tendency to focus on rates and
levels of urbanisation rather than rates of
urban growth obscures the most pressing
demographic challenge of late urbanisation:
the sheer number of new human beings that
need homes and services and jobs in urban
areas.
In both China and sub-Saharan Africa,
the demand for land generated by urban
growth has turbo-charged land markets, sti-
mulating a rush for urban land acquisition
in ways that are shaped by both global
capitalism and local politics (Steel et al.,
2017; Zoomers et al., 2017). However, the
key point here is that this demographic
growth is a crucially important force in its
own right. Moreover, many of the technolo-
gies that facilitate this rapid growth – partic-
ularly in relation to public health and trade
– were developed in early urbanisers to
address the challenges of disease and food
security, and to facilitate capital
accumulation.
Recognising this demographic context is
important for understanding the experience
of late urbanisers vis-à-vis early urbanisers.
While the underlying drivers of urbanisation
are diverse, all late urbanisers are confronted
by extraordinary demographic intensity.
Hyperglobalisation
Cities concentrate capital. How and where
this capital is generated, who controls it, and
how it flows through factor markets (e.g.
land, labour and physical assets) collectively
influence how cities are built and for whom.
Late urbanisers have experienced demo-
graphic intensity in a context of capitalist
‘hyperglobalisation’ (Rodrik, 2015) – a dra-
matic increase in the scale and velocity of
global economic integration from the late
20th century – which has influenced how
and where capital is accumulated, and the
incentives of those who control it. In some
cases, hyperglobalisation has facilitated dra-
matically accelerated urban economic trans-
formations; in others it has contributed to
disinvestment, low productivity and unproduc-
tive investment patterns. Here we examine
these divergent effects of hyperglobalisation in
relation to the nature of the colonial and post-
colonial state, late 20th-century policy condi-
tionalities, and local urban histories.
In many late urbanisers a distinct set of
contextual circumstances has influenced the
incentives of those with capital in ways that
undermine productive and inclusive urban
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development. In early urbanisers capital was
often derived from production and com-
merce, with massive increases in productive
capacity and capital investment fuelling
urban development. Exploitation, corrup-
tion and rent-seeking were rife, but a combi-
nation of political, material and financial
interests incentivised elites to invest in their
cities directly and indirectly (i.e. by pressur-
ing governments to build infrastructure and
provide critical urban services) (Konteh,
2009; McGranahan et al., 2001; Szreter,
1997). Very different patterns of capital
accumulation and flows have emerged in
many late urbanisers.
In sub-Saharan African countries the pri-
mary vehicle for capital accumulation in the
postcolonial era has been the central state;
yet in a continuation of colonial patterns,
states often facilitated private extraction
from the economy rather than productive
investment and redistribution (Bayart et al.,
1999; Maddison, 2007). Moreover, in some
countries unprecedented rent-seeking oppor-
tunities from the extraction of capital-
intensive (as opposed to labour intensive)
natural resources such as oil and copper
emerged, and gave rise to ‘consumption cit-
ies’ (Gollin et al., 2016). Capitalists with the
capacity to develop a competitive manufac-
turing base were few, weak and under-
resourced (Whitfield et al., 2015), leading to
minimal investment in urban productive
capabilities and limited incentives to raise
urban productivity through providing infra-
structure and housing.
The general scarcity of domestic capital
in the early postcolonial era meant that
many late urbanisers depended disproportio-
nately on foreign capital, including loans
from multilateral agencies. In the 1960s and
1970s import-substitution industrialisation
became a widespread economic development
strategy as postcolonial governments sought
to develop their urban manufacturing base
(Mkandawire, 2005). However, as the
economic crises of the 1970s began to
unfold, rising interest rates stimulated capi-
tal flight in many less economically devel-
oped regions and global capital flowed back
towards wealthier countries such as the
USA in the 1980s (Arrighi, 2002). The emer-
gence of the ‘Washington Consensus’ and
the imposition of structural adjustment pro-
grammes led to a strong rejection of import
substitution and renewed focus on primary
commodity exports (Chitonge, 2015;
Mkandawire, 2005). Meanwhile, urban
labour markets became increasingly infor-
malised (Meagher, 1995) and over time ideas
of ‘entrepreneurship’ have become venerated
in place of large-scale investments in urban
productive capacity (Ochonu, 2018).
The currency devaluations required to
promote primary commodity exports raised
the cost of importing the necessary materials
for industrial development, and poor macro-
economic management through economic
crisis further incentivised capital flight.
Meanwhile the globalisation of financial
flows from the late 20th century facilitated
that capital flight, and capital largely
accrued to places where it could be safe and
profitable, and where there were more
opportunities for consumption – in other
words, to early urbanisers. One estimate sug-
gests that 39% of African wealth was held
outside of Africa in 1990, in comparison
with 20% in Latin America, 6% in East Asia
and 3% in South Asia (Collier and Gunning,
1999). Ndikumana and Boyce (2018) esti-
mated capital flight for a sample of 30
African countries between 1970 and 2015
and found that they lost US $1.4 trillion over
this period, while accumulating just US
$496.9 billion in debt by 2015. Perversely,
these debt-ridden countries are actually net
creditors when capital flight is considered in
net capital flow calculations (Ndikumana
and Boyce, 2018). Although there are many
potential causes of capital flight, elite embez-
zlement of public money is a documented
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driver in many cases (Ndikumana and
Boyce, 2003) and not just in Africa.
The ease with which capital can be parked
abroad has distorted domestic investment
incentives for elites – and this capital fluidity
is unique to the late 20th and early 21st cen-
turies. In previous eras, many capitalists
seeking safe, long-term returns would look
closer to home and invest in infrastructure
or productive assets. Those with a higher
risk appetite often engaged in riskier and
more exploitative but profitable trades, such
as slavery, rubber, plantation agriculture in
colonies – often investing the profits in assets
in the metropoles. Today, elites in ‘frontier’
or ‘emerging markets’ looking for an easy
way to protect and grow capital are strongly
incentivised to export it to ‘mature’ markets
in early urbanisers. However, for those look-
ing for higher and more immediate returns,
investments in local real estate and construc-
tion – the ‘secondary circuit’ of capital –
have proved profitable (Goodfellow, 2017;
UN-HABITAT, 2018). Interestingly, when it
comes to real estate investment (as opposed
to infrastructure, which is a longer-term
lower-margin investment prospect), the
majority of capital has come from domestic
and diasporic sources (Goodfellow, 2020).
Although the real estate sector in sub-
Saharan Africa is growing faster than in any
other region globally, very little foreign
investment is involved due to the opacity of
real estate markets to outsiders, ambiguous
land titling and complex land markets (UN-
HABITAT, 2018; Van Gils et al., 2018) –
though efforts to attract it are increasing
(Gillespie, 2020).
In sum, hyperglobalisation has incenti-
vised elites in late urbanisers to secure a size-
able fraction of capital abroad and make
high-margin local investments in real estate
and construction rather than infrastructure
and productive assets, which require special-
ist knowledge and are often seen as too risky
in the face of foreign competition
(Goodfellow, 2017). Moreover, the limited
capacity of governments to effectively moni-
tor property transactions, prevent specula-
tion and tax property can produce a vicious
cycle in which capital gravitates towards real
estate (with limited job creation potential),
the state lacks resources for public invest-
ment, and an underdeveloped industrial sec-
tor continues to offer limited investment
appeal.
Hyperglobalisation can, however, pro-
duce unique pathways for economic devel-
opment – albeit with highly variable
outcomes in terms of structural transforma-
tion, economic growth and job creation.
Hyperglobalisation in the latter decades
of the 20th century saw unprecedented
‘unbundling’ of production processes (Frieden,
2007; Gereffi, 2014; Rodrik, 2015). Due to
technological innovations and a cascade of
trade agreements, the costs of outsourcing
parts of a production process plummeted. This
allowed some late urbanisers to specialise in
relatively low-skilled and labour-intensive
aspects of production processes, which in turn
contributed to accelerated urban industrial
development. This strategy was pursued by the
East Asian ‘Tiger economies’ and subsequently
by China.
The reasons African cities did not experi-
ence accelerated urban industrial develop-
ment despite these trends are complex, but
likely include a combination of political, his-
torical and demographic factors. East Asian
and Latin American countries generally had
longer-standing and more predictable politi-
cal regimes; different colonial histories (over
different time periods) in which there had
often been more substantial investment by
colonisers; and longer histories of state-
building. Moreover, despite low levels of
urbanisation many East Asian and Latin
American countries had long-established
cities and much larger urban populations,
which served as a draw for capitalists look-
ing for cheap labour and new markets.
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In 1970 the urban populations of China,
Brazil and Mexico were 142, 53 and 30 mil-
lion, respectively. By contrast, the entire
urban population of sub-Saharan Africa
was 52 million, divided among dozens of
countries. Small and dispersed urban popu-
lations are less attractive to investors than
large ones concentrated within single coun-
tries – a point highlighted in the 2018 State
of African Cities Report:
Low wages are shown to not be the key motive
for multinational firms to venture abroad.
Rather, they seek cities and countries that sus-
tain large populations, good standards of liv-
ing, sound financial markets, and competition
in terms of producing and marketing exclusive
products. (UN-HABITAT, 2018: 61; emphasis
added)
Late urbanisation can therefore affect coun-
tries differently depending on their demo-
graphic ‘pull’. China has certainly benefited
from its demographic size and the common
perception that it is the largest ‘emerging
market’ opportunity, not only due to its
large workforce and low wages, but also to
the consumer potential of a large and rap-
idly growing urban population. In a context
of free-flowing capital seeking higher returns
than those available in ageing and slow-
growing rich economies, and the feasibility
of capturing a share of rapidly expanding
niches in global value chains, China’s cities
exploded. Hyperglobalisation made hyper-
development in China’s cities possible. As its
‘theatre of accumulation’ shifts from indus-
trial production to urban land and construc-
tion (Hsing, 2010: 2), there are growing
concerns about property bubbles and the
phenomenon of ‘ghost cities’ (Koss and Shi,
2018; Woodworth and Wallace, 2017).
However, this occurred only after the coun-
try became an industrial powerhouse.
Faced with competition from countries in
East Asia, late urbanisers in Africa have
been largely unable to increase either their
share in global manufacturing or the share
of manufacturing within their own econo-
mies (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). Even in
countries where urban manufacturing has
been rising in Africa, such as Ethiopia and
Tanzania, the large firms driving economic
growth are not creating many jobs, due to
their use of capital-intensive technologies
adopted from earlier industrialisers. Thus
the ‘leapfrogging’ of more labour-intensive
technologies that early urbanisers (and
better-positioned late urbanisers in East
Asia) used in their own development path is
a mixed blessing, offering limited job cre-
ation (Diao et al., 2021).
In sum, hyperglobalisation has shaped
the economic fortunes of late urbanisers.
For some, such as China, longer histories of
state-building alongside favourable urban
demography have enabled accelerated urban
economic development. This has made it
even more difficult for other late urbanisers
to compete, and even where they are starting
to attract more international manufacturing
investment, the use of capital-intensive tech-
nologies developed by earlier urbanisers in
an effort to raise productivity has contribu-
ted to the phenomenon of ‘jobless growth’.
Meanwhile, most domestic capital has been
channelled into non-productive investments
in real estate, often involving extensive land
dispossession and speculation, or exported
to early urbanisers.
Centripetal states in a
post-imperial context
Early urbanisers began their transitions
before states became the complex, multi-
functional and centralised territorial organi-
sations that they are today. City states, feudal
states and imperial states taxed their popula-
tions, provided some rudimentary security
and protected trade routes, but they had little
infrastructural power or interest in ‘improv-
ing’ their subjects. Due to technological
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limits, larger states and empires necessarily
relied on local authorities to tax and adminis-
ter security and public order. But as territor-
ial nation-states began to congeal from the
17th century, they increasingly ‘acted like a
vortex sucking in social relations. The out-
come has been the seemingly all-powerful
nation-state of the 20th century’ (Taylor,
1994: 152). By the end of the Second World
War, states became territorially bounded
multi-purpose organisations with highly cen-
tralised administrations. This new state form
was adopted in decolonising regions, as was
the relatively new idea that states have an
active and central role to play in ‘developing’
their populations through ‘modernisation’.
In sum, it was only in the 20th century that
centripetal states became ubiquitous.
This global evolution of state form and
function has had a profound effect on urban
development processes. For early urbanisers
in Europe and America it was generally local
governments that were at the forefront of
dealing with urban challenges, including pub-
lic order, disease and the development of
infrastructure and housing. Indeed, municipal
government grew in a dynamic, symbiotic
relationship with urbanisation and industriali-
sation through local taxation and associated
worker demands for local infrastructure
investment and service provision (e.g. Szreter,
1997). These processes themselves helped to
make states centripetal. As a consequence of
the global diffusion of centralised state forms,
including through colonialism and decolonisa-
tion, central states have played a much more
active role in shaping urban development pro-
cesses in late urbanisers.
In sub-Saharan Africa, the often brutal
institutional and social changes wrought
through colonisation by a handful of
European powers left a long shadow over
postcolonial politics (Mbembe, 1992). Most
colonisers employed forms of both direct
and indirect rule, which were seen as com-
plementary approaches to distinct aspects of
the challenge of colonisation. The exercise of
direct rule in the cities involved forms of
‘centralised despotism’ that served primarily
to exclude the native majority from rights
and freedoms enjoyed by the (largely for-
eign) citizens of colonial cities (Mamdani,
1996: 18). At Independence, many govern-
ments taking over African states comprised
the urban educated elites who were at the
forefront of anti-colonial movements, which
left a power vacuum at the urban level.
Meanwhile, as noted in the previous section,
the domestic urban capitalist classes were
small and often marginal, having often been
deliberately stunted under colonialism
(Brett, 1973; Hydén, 1983). Given this small
capitalist sector, class-based political bar-
gaining with the state was weak relative to
clientelist, kinship and identity-based politics
(Hydén, 1983; Nelson, 1979).
These postcolonial dynamics contrast
with the political context of early urbanisa-
tion in Europe, but aspects offer some signif-
icant parallels with the USA. Nineteenth-
century American cities were likewise char-
acterised by patron–client relations in a con-
text of ethnic diversity, in-migration and
rapid urban growth, which led to what
became characterised as ‘urban political
machines’ (Scott, 1969). As urban popula-
tions rapidly expanded alongside rapid
democratisation, these powerful clientelist
forms of organisation emerged to mobilise
votes and control the scramble for urban
resources. Political machines were a transi-
tional phenomenon, situated after the break-
down of traditional rural ties but before the
emergence of horizontal, class-based ties
and, accordingly, more programmatic poli-
tics. They provided the foundation for what
would become institutionalised, programma-
tic political parties and redistributive states.
Despite some contextual similarities
between 19th-century America and post-
colonial Africa, urban political machines
with the potential to drive distributive
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capacity at the city level have generally not
emerged in late urbanising Africa. Rather
than coalescing at the urban scale, early
political parties in Africa mostly emerged in
the anti-colonial struggle and were national-
ist in orientation; hence the local state has
often been an arena for national political
machines (Nelson, 1979: 199–200). Given
the political significance of ethnicity in post-
colonial Africa, these nationalist parties
often collapsed under the pressures of
ethnic division soon after Independence
(Cheeseman, 2015; Ranger, 1983). Building
cross-ethnic parties that spanned constituen-
cies and regions proved extremely difficult in
many African countries (LeBas, 2011;
Nelson, 1979; Randall and Svåsand, 2002).
The development of political party competi-
tion was also cut off by the widespread turn
towards military rule in a substantial num-
ber of states in the 1970s – a further centri-
petal force (Cheeseman, 2015; Larmer,
2016). These trends were exacerbated by the
Cold War context, in which financial and
political support was channelled to loyal
regimes around the world, often solidifying
already centralised states.
These nationalising, centralising forces
further undercut the municipal state-
building processes which were a feature of
early urbanisers – including the United
States, where a high degree of municipal
capacity existed by the time democratic com-
petition was unleashed in its ethnically clien-
telist cities. This local state-building, in part
a legacy of much greater degrees of colonial
investment in settler colonies such as the
USA, was further propelled by rapid indus-
trialisation and the resource base this gener-
ated (DiGaetano, 1988). In contrast, most
African states carried legacies of externally-
imposed statehood that centralised control
over cities – which themselves were often
new, colonial creations – but with limited
investment. These trends were further ampli-
fied in the postcolonial world of centripetal
states, limiting the prospects for managing
the urban demographic boom. Indeed, there
is evidence that variation in the depth of
colonial investment and extent of indirect
political rule in African countries has had a
direct impact on postcolonial urban devel-
opment outcomes (Fox, 2014). Centralised
states with weak infrastructural power and
shallow municipal histories are poorly
equipped to manage the demographic inten-
sity of late urbanisation. However, not all
late urbanisers lacked histories of municipal
state-building and infrastructural power.
Once again, China provides the extreme
counterpoint.
China’s deep history of municipal govern-
ment (see Chang, 1930) provided solid foun-
dations for adapting to the pressures of late
urbanisation. As Mao’s centrally-planned
rural industrialisation strategy unravelled
during the economic crisis of the late 1970s,
the potential for economic renewal through
urbanisation led to major building of the
administrative and political powers of city
authorities (Gu et al., 2017). This was partly
based on a renewed ideological commitment
to support the growth of cities (Sorace and
Hurst, 2016). The decisive move to build
capacities at the city level came at the very
time when ‘urban bias’ discourses were pro-
moting a shift away from urban investment in
Africa and other parts of Asia (Bates, 1981;
Lipton, 1977). Moreover, when China estab-
lished its urban land leasing system from the
late 1980s, the competition between state
agencies for land rents led local governments
to actively pursue territorial projects of urban
expansion, growing their revenue base, which
in turn required them to consolidate and legit-
imate their powers (Hsing, 2010).
Just as China embraced urban develop-
ment, many African governments adopted a
laissez-faire approach to urban governance
and slashed municipal capacity against a
backdrop of donor pressures and political
turbulence. The end of the Cold War was
Fox and Goodfellow 13
accompanied by widespread measures to
promote democracy, instil ‘good’ Western-
modelled institutions and support the build-
ing of particular kinds of states (Brown,
2005). This inflamed political divisions sup-
pressed by colonialism and Cold War-era
dictatorships, and the resulting political tur-
bulence intersected with new forms of
externally-driven institutional engineering.
Part of this engineering involved the promo-
tion of agricultural development over urban
development (see Fox, 2014) and the adop-
tion of urban institutions developed in early
urbanisers. By the 1990s, principles of
market-led urban management and urban
entrepreneurialism were promoted in cities
where the local state, often weak to begin
with, had been further weakened by the cen-
tralist impulses of the Cold War (Fox and
Goodfellow, 2016; Stren, 1993). Meanwhile,
the other major governance reform widely
promoted by donors – decentralisation –
created new sites in which clientelistic poli-
tics could play out. Given the prior neglect
of local state-building, decentralisation often
occurred in the absence of the necessary
political institutions to manage local compe-
tition, without sufficient resources at city
level to enable urban authorities to act
autonomously, and with significant political
interference from the centripetal national
state (Wunsch, 2001).
In sum, late urbanisation has occurred in
the historically unique context of
territorially-bounded centripetal states, and
a global institutional context that has been
used to promote particular strategies of
‘modernisation’ and ‘good governance’. By
the late 20th century, these strategies
included economic liberalisation and (ironi-
cally) decentralisation of state functions.
These conditions are in some ways the
reverse of many early urbanisers’ experience,
in which central states evolved to a large
extent out of municipal capacities (Tilly,
1994) and faced little external pressure to
adopt particular development strategies. In
Africa, where local state-building had rarely
been prioritised, this has contributed to
underinvestment and an inability of munici-
pal authorities to keep pace with demo-
graphic intensity. In China, elements of an
‘early urbaniser’ history of municipal devel-
opment, its independence from the dictates
of multilateral policy regimes and a renewed
ideological commitment to urban develop-
ment have contributed to the hyper-
development of cities, to the point that
urban property development in some places
has outpaced demographic demand
(Woodworth and Wallace, 2017).
Urbanising in the late
Anthropocene
It is now widely accepted by scientists that
we live in the ‘Anthropocene’ – a new geolo-
gical epoch defined by changes attributable
to anthropogenic activities such as colonisa-
tion, agriculture and urbanisation (Lewis
and Maslin, 2018). While there is some
debate about when the Anthropocene began,
the conditions of the late Anthropocene are
historically distinct. We are now living with
the spectre of imminent environmental cata-
strophe – and this spectre looms particularly
large in rapidly growing cities in late urba-
nising regions.
The growing awareness of humanity’s
impacts on the planet has implications for
managing urbanisation that are particularly
significant for late urbanisers. Cities have
gone from being seen as ‘villains’ in debates
on climate change (Dodman, 2009) to
becoming the ‘darling trope of the interna-
tional environmental policy regime’ (Castán
Broto, 2020: 2371), with the potential to
‘save the planet’ (Angelo and Wachsmuth,
2020). Alongside this dual status as both vil-
lains and potential saviours, cities in late
urbanising regions are the most vulnerable to
the effects of climate change and other forms
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of environmental degradation (Hardoy et al.,
2013). While localised environmental prob-
lems such as industrial pollution had impor-
tant consequences for early urbanisers,
countries attempting to manage urbanisation
today are affected by an historically unique
combination of exposure to environmental
hazards, increased environmental responsi-
bility and a multi-level institutional architec-
ture for environmental governance.
As concerns with global climate change
mounted, cities came to the fore as central
actors in the narrative of environmental
destruction. It is undeniable that climate
change is to some degree produced through
the urban condition; wealthy urbanised soci-
eties with an insatiable thirst for cheap
energy have driven climate change (Bulkeley,
2013; Hardoy et al., 2013). However, it is pri-
marily rising affluence rather than urbanisa-
tion per se that matters (Satterthwaite,
2009). Moreover, increased interest in vari-
ous forms of ‘extended urbanisation’ high-
lights the fact that climate change drivers
associated with urbanisation are not necessa-
rily located within cities (Brenner and
Schmid, 2015; Schmid et al., 2018). Cities
also vary hugely in their contribution to cli-
mate change, even among late urbanisers.
Many cities in China and South-east Asia
have seen steep rises in emissions associated
with industrialisation. Indeed, those that
have been most successful in managing the
global economic conditions of late urbanisa-
tion have done so by developing ‘production
cities’ (Gollin et al., 2016), and by exploiting
the cheapest and most technologically acces-
sible forms of production available to them
at the time.
At the same time, it is starkly apparent
that cities in late urbanising countries are
much more vulnerable to the deleterious
effects of climate change than those in early
urbanising countries. The 20-fold difference
in mortality between the Philippines and
Japan when they were hit by typhoons of
the same intensity is a stark reminder of this
(Satterthwaite, 2013). The correlation
between countries currently urbanising, and
those most at risk, is striking. According to
a climate change risk index produced by
Verisk Maplecroft, a global risk analysis
firm, 84 of the 100 fastest-growing cities in the
world by population are rated as being at
‘extreme risk’, with a further 14% being ‘high
risk’. Over 95% of the cities most affected by
climate change globally are in Africa and Asia.
Meanwhile, 86% of the 292 cities considered
‘low risk’ are in early urbanisers in Europe and
the Americas.1 In situations where rural liveli-
hoods are devastated by environmental change,
many cities also face increased pressure to
accommodate refugees from rural hinterlands
(Biermann and Boas, 2010).
Despite these vulnerabilities and urgent
adaptation needs, the most significant narra-
tive about cities’ roles in relation to climate
change today casts them as sites of opportu-
nity; potential ‘saviours’ in which sustainable
ways of living can best be realised (Angelo
and Wachsmuth, 2020; Glaeser, 2011).
Creutzig et al. (2015) argue that for ‘mature’
cities in affluent regions – most of which are
‘consumption’ cities – carbon emissions can
be significantly reduced through changes to
fuel taxation alongside adjustments to urban
form through greater mixed-use urban
design. Yet for developing countries with
nascent infrastructure there is significant
potential to prevent unsustainable urban
form at an early stage. As well as being an
opportunity, this places a great burden of
expectation on late urbanising countries, in
the sense that to minimise their environmen-
tal impact they need to design their whole
infrastructure and urban layout (as well as
any urban industrial policy) in line with
priorities of low-carbon development.
This expectation has particular signifi-
cance for late urbanisers in which manufac-
turing industry is minimal, private
automobile use remains limited and the built
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environment is less established (hence poten-
tially more malleable). Informal settlements
and ‘slums’ have a particularly significant
role in urban environmental discourses, hav-
ing been associated with environmental
degradation right into the 21st century
(Davis, 2006; UN-HABITAT, 2004).
However, according to Angelo and
Wachsmuth (2020) this started to change
around 2010 when international discourse
began to reframe informal settlements as
vibrant innovators of sustainable urbanism
and compact form. This was part of a
broader shift through which cities transi-
tioned from being 20th-century sustainabil-
ity problems to 21st-century sustainability
solutions (Angelo and Wachsmuth, 2020).
Yet cities of the global South are hugely
diverse in their ‘urban energy landscapes’,
which are embedded in complex relations
between historically configured flows, gener-
ating divergent prospects for sustainability
transitions (Castán Broto, 2019).
The growing push for city-level solutions
to climate change has led to successive waves
of urban experimentation through purposive
interventions to reconfigure urban sociotech-
nical systems (Castán Broto and Bulkeley,
2013). The notion that cities can embody
sustainable lifestyles is welcome, but gener-
ates further pressures on them to adopt par-
ticular policies and approaches – pressures
that are profoundly more complicated in late
urbanisers, given the demographic intensity
and underinvestment we have highlighted. It
is significant that C40 Cities - a key interna-
tional organisation in this arena, which
declares that ‘ending climate change begins
in the city’ - includes increasing numbers of
late urbanisers. Thirteen new cities joined in
2007, and the network now includes 10 cities
in Africa as well as over 30 in Asia.
The translation of climate governance
‘from the realm of international negotiations
to a context of planners and urbanists’
(Acuto, 2013: 842) places a substantial onus
on urban policy and planning systems that
have been undermined through decades of
restructuring, downsizing and neglect. As
the urban climate governance ideal becomes
increasingly technocratic and marketised,
this might ‘prompt further hierarchisation
between ‘global’ and ‘ordinary’ cities’
(Acuto, 2013: 857). More immediately, the
discourse of environmental sustainability
can be instrumentalised by governments in
late urbanising countries to legitimise slum
clearances and the eviction of the poor from
urban centres, as illustrated by the case of
Kigali (Hudani, 2020). Indeed, environmen-
tal discourses are often used alongside
‘world city’ visions and service sector-
oriented growth strategies by governments
seeking to emulate specific urban experi-
ences from other countries, but with addi-
tional ecological credentials.
Yet global environmental discourse in the
late Anthropocene can also constrain eco-
nomic growth and structural transformation,
particularly where donors apply environmen-
tal conditionalities to development finance.
An example from Uganda illustrates this
point. Namanve Industrial Park, east of
Kampala, is a flagship site in Uganda’s strat-
egy for industrialisation and urban employ-
ment-generation. The government of Uganda
reached an agreement with the World Bank
to finance much-needed improvement of the
park’s infrastructure. However, after pledging
this finance the Bank eventually pulled out,
citing environmental concerns relating to wet-
land and forest conservation.2 This kind of
story, in which access to international finance
is constrained by environmental considera-
tions, is repeated across the continent – and
often for very good reasons. The point is not
to deny the importance of environmental con-
servation and climate change mitigation, but
to highlight the extent to which late urbanisers
face a global environmental regime that con-
ditions urban possibilities in ways that were
unheard of in times of early urbanisation.
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Moreover, these conditionalities derive in
large part from the experience and priorities
of early urbanisers. The historical sequen-
cing of urban transitions therefore matters:
early urbanisers generated levels of environ-
mental damage that force late urbanisers to
confront the formidable challenge of build-
ing low-carbon economies while also gener-
ating higher value-added activity with less
capital in a more competitive global econ-
omy. They face heightened intensity of envi-
ronmental change, and increased complexity
in the processes required for urban environ-
mental governance. The question in this con-
text is not whether low-carbon, sustainable
forms of urbanism should be pursued by late
urbanisers – they undoubtedly should – but
rather who should pay for this, and how
these transitions can be generated out of
existing urban energy landscapes without
decimating the livelihoods of urban-dwellers
(Castán Broto, 2019).
Once again, China provides a counter-
point. Despite being a late urbaniser,
China’s accelerated economic transforma-
tion was quite advanced by the time global
environmental governance took hold, and it
has been successful enough to avoid depen-
dence on foreign aid with its attendant con-
ditionalities. Although China has certainly
faced pressure to reduce climate emissions,
its ability to respond was enhanced by its
economic success and the fact that certain
cities have been leading producers of low-
carbon technologies; as such, they have an
economic as well as environmental interest
in sustainable urbanism (Yu and Huang,
2020). China is now a leading international
player in experimenting with new forms of
urban climate governance (Westman and
Castán Broto, 2018). The very same global
environmental conditions that exert a range
of constraints on African cities are increas-
ingly part of China’s economic success.
Conclusion
The conditions of late urbanisation are not
adequately accounted for by existing theori-
sations of urbanisation. Yet these conditions
are salient when seeking to understand pro-
cesses unfolding in rapidly urbanising
regions. The later the urban transition
occurs in a particular country, the greater
the range of urban experiences and ‘models’
from elsewhere that are available for emula-
tion – or evasion. But greater too are the
constraints on countries’ autonomy in navi-
gating the urban transition. This is the para-
dox of late urbanisation.
While all cities are affected to some
degree by some of the conditions of late
urbanisation, there is an important distinc-
tion between the general challenge of man-
aging urban change under these conditions
and the specific predicament of navigating an
urban transition under them. Undergoing
this transition significantly after many other
parts of the world means inheriting the tech-
nologies, epistemologies and environmental
hazards associated with those earlier transi-
tions. This has crucial implications for
demography, governance, economy and
ecology. Although the planetary urbanisa-
tion discourse acknowledges that the urban
process in general ‘evolve[s] historically in
relation to broader patterns and pathways of
global capitalist development’ (Brenner and
Schmid, 2014: 750), it does not adequately
account for the varied temporalities of urban
transitions across geographic regions and
their significance. Similarly, although Scott’s
latest contribution to the debate takes on
board some of the exogenous aspects of the
urban process that affect cities’ internal
order (Scott, 2021), this perspective does not
account for how major historical shifts in
these exogenous factors impact on different
geographies of urbanisation.
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Rather than specify a macro-historical
process, we emphasise the need to attend to
urbanisation’s geohistorical variations to
better understand diverse trajectories of
urban change around the world. Indeed,
they partly explain why we require ‘new
vocabularies’ of urbanisation (Schmid et al.,
2018). Meanwhile, attempts to tightly define
the urban through ideas such as the ‘urban
land nexus’ (Storper and Scott, 2016) cannot
account for why the constituent features of
this nexus (such as agglomeration and nod-
ality) tend to take different modal forms in
late urbanising countries relative to early
urbanisers.
The analysis offered in this paper also
shows why the dispute over universality of
the urban versus Southern particularism
fails to adequately account for the vast dif-
ferences in urbanisation experience within
the global South. By contrasting the experi-
ences of African countries with those of
China, we have shown that shared condi-
tions associated with late urbanisation have
yielded diverse outcomes due to interaction
effects with local demographic, economic
and political histories. The conditions of late
urbanisation clearly matter, but they are not
deterministic and yield a range of distinct
trajectories as they collide with local
conditions.
Late urbanisation is neither a blessing
nor a curse. Urbanising relatively late holds
the possibility of being a forerunner of new
paradigms of urban economy and urban liv-
ing. This is particularly important in the face
of mounting environmental crises and the
evident insufficiency of dominant economic
models to adequately provide for the needs
of all of the world’s city-dwellers. The
absences of infrastructure that characterise
many late urbanising contexts necessitate
improvisation and innovation (Simone,
2004), as is evident from fields as diverse as
mobile money, waste-to-energy and renew-
ables (Beck et al., 2015; Dutta et al., 2018).
History is not a level playing field, and early
urbanisers consolidated their economic gains
through imperial, and subsequently capital-
ist, global dominance. This dominance is
weakening, but its legacies die hard. The
challenges posed by late urbanisation will
continue to produce innovations, and this
will be an important part of the story of
urbanism – much of which has yet to be told.
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